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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff • Respondent

Case No,

890185 - CA

v.

Category No,

E. ODELL STANLEY
Defendant - Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a conviction and Judgement rai of one Count of
A third degree felony and one count of

ff

,f

Operating a Pyramid Schema

Practicing Medicine without a license

ff

, a Third

degree felony following a Jury Trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court, County of
Utah, State of Utah, The Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge Presiding.

E. ODELL STANLEY
Appellant In Pro Se
P, 0. Box 925
Orem, Utah 84059

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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AMENDED

TEXT OF STATUTES

AUG J
Utah Code Annotated 58_-^2_-2_B _[4J_ _[A]_ as amended:
Mary-

(4) Practice of Medicine means:

.

C/er/< ~
y^hCc

(a) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or prescribe fro any
huiran disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition
physical or mental, real or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any means
by instrumentality.
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-30 tJ.C.A. Medical Practice Act.
Practice of Medicine without a_ License - a. Felony
A FELONY ~ EXCEPTIONS.
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine in this state
without first obtaining a license shall be guilty of; except the following
persons MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
SUBJECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIMITATIONS STATED:
(5) any individual administration a domestic or family remedy
including those persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, health
food or health food supplements, herb or other products of
nature, except drugs or medicine for which an authorized
prescription is required by law.
Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-l £.C.A.
to safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has
consented to the interception OILY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY A COURT OF THE COMPETENT
JURISDICTION and should remain under the control and supervision of the
authorizing court, interception of wire and oral communications should
further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific catagories
of crimes with assurance that the interception is justified and that the
information abtained thereby NOT BE misused.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 77-^-26 (b) (1) (1953 as amended) and 78-2a-3 (e) (1953) (as
amended) under which provisions a defendant is a criminal case may appeal
th the Utah Court of Appeals from a Final Judgement where, as in the instant
case, there is no conviction of a. First Degree Felony nor a Capitol Felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Was the Appellant a recipient of such sub-standard legal representation
as to entitled him to relief under the second prong of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?
2. Was the Trial Court Divested of subject matter jurisdiction when the
state preoecuted the Appellant under a statute that did not clearly
cover the case?
3. Was the Appellant convicted without evidence of his guilt?
4. Are the provisions which purportedly cover the offense of "Pyramid
Schemes" and coded 76-6a-3 U.C.A. unconstitutionally void for vagueness?

TEXT OF STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated 76-12-28 (4) (A) as amended:
(4) Practice of Medicine means:
(a) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or prescribe fro any
human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition
physical or mental, real or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any means
by instrumentality.
Utah Code Annotated 76-12-30 U..C.A. Medical Practice Act.
Practice of Medicine without a. License - a. Felony
A FELONY - EXCEPTIONS.
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine in this state
without first obtaining a license shall be guilty of; except the following
persons MAY ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
SUBJECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIMITATIONS STATED:
(5) any individual administration a domestic or family remedy
including those persons engaged in the sale of vitamins, health
food or health food supplements, herb or other products of
nature, except drugs or medicine for which an authorized
prescription is required by law.
Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-l £.C.A.
to safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of
wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has
consented to the interception ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED BY A COURT OF THE COMPETENT
JURISDICTION and should remain under the control and supervision of the
authorizing court, interception of wire and oral communications should
further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories
of crimes with assurance that the interception is justified and that the
information abtained thereby NOT BE misused.

Utah Code Annotated 76-23a-4 U.C.A.
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter
any person who does any of the following is GUILTY OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY.
(c) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other
person the contents of wire or oral communications knowing or having reason
to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire
or oral communication in violation of this sub-section.
Utah Code Annotated 7723a-7 as amended
"Whenever any wire or oral communicationhas been
intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and
no evidence derived therefrom may be recieved in evidence in
any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court,
Grand Jury, Department, Officer, Agency, Regulatory body,
Legislative Committee or other authority of the State or Political
Subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would
be in violation of this chapter.
Utah Code Annotated 77-23a-8 as amended
The Attorney General of the State of Utah or any
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney
General or any County Attorney or any Deputy County Attorney
specifically designated by the County Attorney may authorize
an application of a Utah State District Court Judge of competent
Jurisdiction for and the Judge may grant in conformity with the
procedure for interception of wire or oral communication by any
law enforcement agency of this state or any political sugdivision having responsibility for the investigation of the type
of offense regarding which the application is made.

When the

ionterception sought may provide or has provided evidence of:

(1) any crime punishable by death or imprisonment
for more that one (1) year in the Utah State Prison.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890185 - CA

v*

Category No.

E. ODELL STANLEY,
Defendant-Appe1lant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted the Appellant, E. Odell Stanley, of the ofenses of
(a) "Operating a pyramid scheme", a third degree felony in violation of
76-6a-3 U..C.A., and (b) "Practicing Medicine without a License", a third
degree felony in violation of 58-12-28(4)(a) £.C.A. Mr. Stanley appeals
from a judgement and conviction of the said offenses that was rendered in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, County of Utah, State of Utah, Honorable Boyd
L. Park, Judge presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during the month of March, 1988 the appellant recieved
a telephone call from Rosamunde C. Krolls of Provo, Utah who wanted the
appellant to go to her residence and treat her for so-called "High-Blood Pressure",
(T. 45).
Under oath, the said Mrs. Krolls admitted that an "Investigator
for the Utah County Attorney!s Office" named Frank D. Wall had "wired" the

residence of the said Mrs Kroll (T. 49) , in order to have Mrs. Kroll lull
the appellant (Mr. Stanley) into "a False Sense of Security" and thereby
illegally obtain evidence upon which prosectuion could base its charge and
only upon such recorded visit to the Kroll!s residence at Mrs. Krolls request
was the charge of "Practicing Medicine without a. License" erroneously filed
against the appellant and pursuant to which lawlessly recorded session
(requested session) between the appellant and the said Mrs. Krolls the appellant
was unconstitutionally convicted.
Mrs. Krolls further testified that her daughter, who was an employee
of the Utah County Attorney who called her and told her to call the appellant
(T. 45) / and thus subject him to the aforesaid set-up for the prosecution
by the Utah County Attorney's Office of the appellant for the improvised
charges of "Parcticing Medicine without a. License" and "Operating a. Pyramid
Scheme". Mrs. Krolls testified to buying a bottle of distilled water (Hyro
peroxide) (T. 46) and was aware of the tape recording (T. 52).
The Utah County Attorneyfs Investigator, a Frank D. Wall who
testified that he was a policeman "for 17 years" (T. 53), admitted that he
"personally" arranged "the tape recording" of the fake "treatment" needed by
the said Mrs. Krolls (T. 53).
However, a close examination of both the testimony and tape
recording of Mr. Stanley's requested (set-up) visit to Mrs Krolls home (T. 45)
fails to revel that such lawless recorded interview of Mrs. Krolls in
violation of 76-23a-l and 76-23a-4 (c) £.C.A. provided any reasonable
ascertainable evidentiary basis upon which the appellants conviction could
constitutionally stand.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the instant case is obviously based upon the self-imposed

blindness of Defense Counsel who refused to see the County Attorney's
employment of a variation on a Police Entrapment tactic that has been
dignified with the name of "Sting Operation"; the significance being an
ex-policeman who testified under oath that his name was Frank D. Wall and he
had been a. policeman for 17 years, (T. 53) but had been an "Investigator" for
the Utah County Attorney's Office for the past 18 months (T. 53) and that he
had personally arranged for the recording of the oral communications between
the appellant Stanley and the said Mrs. Krolls (at the Krolls private
residence) and above all such lawless Recording was set-up by the said
"Investigator" Frank D. Wall (T. 53) with the (a) required authorization and
supervision of a Court per 76-23a-l £.C.A., nor the consent of appellant
Stanley, and (b) such deceptive recording was done with the full knowledge of
the said Mrs. Krolls (at her home) (T. 50) with the knowledge that it would
be turned over to Investigator Frank D. Wall for the prosecution of the
appellant for the improvised charge of "Practicing Medicine without a. License"
and such know non-Judicially approved method of eavesdropping constituted a
"Third Degree Felony" at 76-23a-4 (<c) U..C.A.
Above all "But for" the total self-imposed blindness of ineffective
Defense Council the state should not have been able to profit from the "Fruits
of its unlawfulness" via its County Attorney"s Office lawless use of evidence
that should have been suppressed but was treated with deliberate silence or
ignorance or both by Defense Council at critical stages of the proceedings
against the appellant.
Relative to the "Pyramid Scheme", its evidence is left very much
in doubt on the face of the record and the Statutory provision purportedly
covering such an offense is unconstitutionally viod for vagueness.
Finally, returning to the erroneous charge of "Practicing Medicine

without a License". The prosecution at page 3_ of the Trail Transcript moved
the Court to "amend the Information" to charge the appellant under 58-12-28(4)
(A) and over the objection of the Defense Council said, Motion was granted,
(T. 3) , and by such action the Court divested itself of Jurisdiction of the
subject-matter because the Utah Supreme Court has declared that the prosecution
must proceed under the statute that "clearly covers the case", Ogden City v.
McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387.
The appellant was therefore convicted without evidence of his guilt
and Due Process of Law at Article I, Section 7 Constitution of Utah, and the
5th and 14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution were violated thereby.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Appellant respectfully contends that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at "critical stages of the proceedings" against him,
he was unconstitutionally convicted of both "Practicing Medicine without a
License" and "Operating a. Pyramid Scheme".
In support of the foregoing contention, the appellant, respectfully
submits that while the question of "Ineffective Counsel" may ordinarily be
inappropriately raised on "Direct Appeal". United States v. Winkle, 722 F.2d
605-12 (10th Cir., 1983), United States v. Griffin, 699 F.2d 1102, 1107-09
(10th Cir. 1983), and the United States Supreme Court has granted latitude
to raise "ineffective assistance claims" collaterally.

Kimmelman v. Morrison,

106 S.Ct. 2574, 2585 (1986).
The Appellant nevertheless respectfully submits that he does not
bring to the captioned Court...and ordinary case...but a case in which the
sub-standard performance of Defense Counsel was so indisputably ineffective
clear upon the face of the Record that but for such INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
at the following specific "critical stages" of the proceedings, no "Rational
finder of fact" could have found "Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" as to
"EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED", 76-1-501 U.C.A, IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and at this point,
the Court's attention is especially referred to the Trial Transcript at page 44
where:
1. A Rosamunde C. Krolls of Provo, Utah testified that she is
"THE MOTHER OF A BARBARA AXELGARD", secretary in the County
Attorneyfs Office (Utah County), (lines 17 thru 24).
2.

At Trial Transcript - page 45 - the said Rosamunde C Krolls
testified that (a) because her said daughter, Barbara had
asked her to telephone the Appellant (who was a stranger
to her) and invite the Appellant into her Living Room

which she knew had been wired for recordings to be made
(T. 45) and that (b) a Utah County Investigator (Frank G. Walls)
had wired her living room to record the oral communications
between herself and the Appellant.
3. At Trial Transcript - page 53, A Frank D. Wall identifies himself
as a "Sargent Special Investigator with the Utah County
Attorney's Office" and (2) that he had been a police officer
approximately 17 years and (3) an "Investigator for the
County Attorney's Office fa year and a half" (line 8) and
(4) HE ARRANGED THE TAPE RECORDING THAT WAS MADE AT THE TIME
(MARCH 10, 1988) (where the appellant was at the Krolls'
Living Room as aforesaid), (Trial Transcript page 53 lines 1-19).
The Appellant respectfully submits that the TOTAL SILENCE and hence
inaction of Defense Counsel relative to the LAWLESS MANNER IN WHICH the State
totally declined to accord the "accused" (appellant) any "option" whatsoever
in the question of whether he (the appellant) desired:
"TO ASSIST THE STATE (IN RECORDING HIS KROLLS INTERVIEW)
and thereby "assist the State in securing his conviction"
ACCORD: Rationale of Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
And it is so because in neither:

1. Defense Counsel!s "Motion to Dismiss"

that covers pages 86-88 of The Trial Transcript, nor 2. Defense Counsel's
Final Summation to the Trial Jury does Defense Counsel object to the unlawfulness
of the recording and use at trial of the oral communications in the aforesaid
"Living Room" of Rosamunde C. Krolls (T. 45) as "arranged by Investigator
Frank D. Wall" (T. 53) but still "a Third Degree Felony" at 76-23a-4(l) (C)
IJ.C.A.
1. "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter,
any person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony
in the Third Degree".
C.

"willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person
the contents of any wire or oral communication knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire or oral communication is in
violation of this section".

And while the "Investigator" for the Utah County Attorney's Office (Frank G.
Wall) bragged about "setting-up" the appellant (T. 151 and T. 158).

The indisputable lawlessness of a mere "Investigator" for the County
Attorneyf s Office does not satisfy the pre-requisites to the lawful1 eavesdropping (wire-tapping) oral communications as was unlawfully done relative
to the

appellant aforesaid being lulled to the wired living room of Rosamunde

C. Krolls (T. 45) by the phone call of Mrs, Krolls herself (T. 45) and
"arranged" by the said "INvestigator" Frank Wall (T. 53) without any conpliance
with the following provisions of 77-23a-8 £.C.A. (of Record).
77-23a-8 tJ.C.A.: The Attorney General of the State of Utah or any
Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney
General or any County Attorney or any Deputy County Attorney
specifically designated by the County Attorney may authorize
an application to a Utah State District Court Judge of Competent
Jurisdiction for and the Judge may grant in conformity with
the proceedure for interception or wire or oral communication
by any law enforcement agency of the State or any Political
sugdivision having responsibility for the investigation of the
type of offense regarding which the application is made, when
the interception sought will provide or has provided evidence of:
1. Any crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than
one year in the Utah State Prison.
2.

A violation of the Controlled Substance Act Chapter 37, Title 58
or,

3. any conspiracy to commit any of the crimes named in this section•
And relative to the admissability of the fruit of lawless Recordations of
oral communications such as admittedly occurred in the instant case by Mrs.
Krolls at T. 45 and Investigator Wall at T. 53, T. 151 and T. 158. The Utah
Legislature has clearly spelled out the following prohibitions at 77-23a-7
Evidence Exclusion Rule:
77-23a-7 £.£• A.: Whenever any wire or or al communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and
no evidence derived therefrom may be recieved in evidence in any
trial, hearing or other proceeding, in or before any Court,
Grand Jury, Department, Officer, Agency, Reglatory Body,
Leglislative Committee of the State or other authority of the
State or political subdivision thereof if the disclosure would be
a violation of this chapter.

The Appellant respectfully contends that inasmuch as the record is
silent as to compliance with the preceding pre-requisites to valid eavesdropping
(wire-tapping and recordation) at 77-23a-8

tJ.CZ.A.and "Waiver cannot be

presumed from a silent record" (Carnley y. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 1962) it
must reasonable follow, at law, therefrom that non-compliance with the requisites
of 77-23a-8 UiC.A. was fatal to any form or use or the recorded communications
between the appellant and Rosamunde C. Krolls (T. 45, T. 53) and the "set-up"
of the appellant (T. 151, T. 158) admitted by the Investigator to have been
effected by such "living room recordings" (T. 45) and the States total
dependence upon such inadmissible evidence (per 77-23a-7 LLC.A.) should clearly
prevent any circumvention of the inescapable fact that the so-called "practicing
medicine without a lecense" (58-12-28-/4/ (a.) £.C.A.) being a clear and
obvious product of inadmissible lawlessly recorded oral communications in
violation of 77-23a-4(l) (c) tJ.C.A., 77-23a-7 £.C.A. and 77-23a-8 U.C.A., and
for such specific reason has been unconstitutionally employed to effect the
fataly defective conviction that is now being respectfully appealed and should
not be allowed to stand.
Finally, in further satisifaction the the second prong of Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) the appellant respectfully submits that
the Supreme Court has declared the following "stages of the proceedings"
"Critical"...at which "the guiding hand of counsel" (Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S
45 /1932/), which is synonymous with "the effective assistance of counsel" is
expressly required:
1. At the Preliminary Hearing - (a state constitution right at
Art. I Sec. 13. See: White v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963).
2.

At Arraignment - Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1962)

3.

At Trial - Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .

4.

At Sentencing - Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128
(1968) .

5.

On Appeal - Douglas v. California, 373 U.S. 353
(1963) .

And relative to such "critical stages" the complete Record in the
instant case because no room for any doubt whatsoever that
Defense Council was (a) Deliberately unaware (indifferent), to the
lawless recording and the use of the illegally obtained oral
communication (in violation of 77-23a-8 U..C.A. , 77-23a-7 tJ.C.A. ,
and 77-23a-4 (1) (c)

£.(:.A.), or was ignorant of such State Statutory

provisions or both but whatever be the truth of the matter, the
"Record is the best evidence" of the fact that the Appellant was
indisputably denied "The Effective assistance of Counsel" at the
forestated critical stages of the proceedings against him and in
such specific regard, the Supreme Court said:
"When the effective assistance of counsel
is denied aj: a. critical stage of the
proceedings against the accused, we will
automatically REVERSE and will not
listen to any nice "calculations about
the amount of prejudice arising therefrom",
cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942) .
Left clearly without "The Guiding Hand of Counsel",
Powell y. Alabama, Supra, and the inherent "Fundamental Fairness"
also denied thereby (Gideon y. Wainwright, Supra), the appellant1s
conviction should not be allowed to stand.
POINT II
The prosecution proceeded under the Provisions of

58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C..A. which merely define and hence do not
"clearly cover" the facts of the instant case nor the controlling
law and for such reason the subject-matter Jurisdiction of the
Trial Court was not invoked and its judgement should be declared
a nullity.
The Appellant was charged under, and convicted, pursuant
to the provisions of 58-12-28 (4) (A) £.C.A., which are worded as
fololows:
58-12-28 (4) (A) .U.C.A.
(4) Practice of Medicine means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct
advise or prescribe for any human disease
ailment, injury, informity, deformity, pain
or other condition, physical or mental, real
or imaginary or to attempt to do so by any
means or instrumentality.
Thus it is readily apparent that the above provisions
of
58-12-28 (4) (A) U.C.A. merely define (define) what the phrase
W D J ^ S ct ''orac'iic'
words of "practice of medicine" mean and as such:
1.

_Do not prescribe a. penalty, nor

2.

Recognize "conduct that is free" condemnation as
criminal as directed by the Utah Legislature
at 76-1-104 (2) £.C.A. and spelled out in the
controlling statutory provision in the instant
case at 58-12-30 (5) U..C.A.

Turning to the applicable and controlling applicable
Statutory porvisions (i.e. 58-12-30(5) U.C.A.) it should be first
not that the Utah Supreme Court nor the Utah Legislature's have
retreated from the well settled principle of law that "a crime or
public offense must be prohibited or commanded and for which a
penalty is provided, and both requisites (1) a pentaly and
(2) applicable statutory section that "c/early covers the case"
is existent in the following substance of 58-12-30 (5) £.C.A.,

58-12-30 Medical Practice Act - practice of
medicine without a license, a felony
Exceptions.
NOTE: Even in the very caption above
i.e. "practice of medicine without a. license"
are the identical words used to charge the
appellant and still the prosecution
erroneously "amended" from the
applicable provisions of 58-12-30 (5) IJ-C^A.
to the "definition" at 58-12-28(4)(A)tJ.C.A.
over the objections of defense coulsel as
follows:
Trial Transcripts - pages 3 to 4:
Mr. Madsen: We would move to amend, what is count no. II
by srriking the "1" in the citation to 58-12-28(3) in its entirely
and adding sub (4) after practicing medicine without a license.,
Mr. Harston: Well again we counted on discussing three
and four at length and he had been held to account for that to
date.

I can't stipulate to that

amendment and we would oppose

it and would like the jury to consider all of it.
THE COURT: Okay, the Court having heard the motion,
amd the objection, the Court having reviewed 58-12 which is a
medical practice act finds that it is appropriate motion on the
part of the State to restrict the charges to 58-12-28 (4) (A) which
is the parctice of medicine and the definition under (A) and the
Court would hold the plaintiff to the restricted definition of
sub-paragrapri (A) and grant the motion.

The Court will change

the amended information by interlineation to so reflect the motion
okay.
Thus by the Court, "restricting" the "Plaintiff"(
(Prosecution" to "that restricted definition of sub-paragraph (A)"

(Trial Transcript - page 4, line 2 ) , the Trial Court thereby restricted the
prosecution to the following substance of subsection (A)of 58-12-28.
A.

to diagnose, treat correct, advise, or prescribe for any
human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity,
pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary or attempt to do so by any means or
instrumentality.

did then and there expressly divest the Court of subject-matter Jurisdiction
by its "restriction" of the prosecution to Section (A) of 58-12-28(4) (A)
above exclusively because:
1.

58-12-28(4) Sub-Section (A) above;
(a)

does not cover and prohibit conduct under the laws of
the State of Utah.

(b) Does not accord any Court of the State of Utah an expressed
or implied latitude to punish the above listed condust
under the "restricted" sub-section (A) as a crime or
public offense.
And where, as is obvious, the Trial Judge has expressed concurred in the
incerdible motion of the Prosecuting Attorney at pages 3 and 4 of the Trial
Transcripts and "restricted" the prosecution to the prosecution's requested
"amendment" of the "Information" to read a violation of 58-2-28(4) (A) U..C.A.
Still, the Trial Court acted apparently oblivious of the Utah Supreme Court's
warning that:
"no matter how reprehensible the condust of the accused
may be yet no punishment can be inflicted without a law
authorizing it and such law must clearly cover the case.
Ogden City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387.
And therefore applied to the instant case the applicable and controlling
provisions of 58-12-30 U..C.A. must be respected if the Trial Court's subjectmatter Jurisdiction is to be properly invoked.
The controlling and applicable provisions of 58-12-30 U.C.A. are
captioned and worded as follows:

58-12-30 Medical Practice Act - Practice of Medicine without a
License a Felony - Exceptions.
It is unlawful to engage in the practice of medicine
in this state without first obtaining a license is
guilty of a felony; escept the following persons
may engage in activities included in the parctice
of medicine subject to circumstances and limitations
stated:
(5) any individual administering a domestic or
family remedy including those persons engaged in the
sale of vitamins, health food, or health food
supplements, herb or other products of nature,
except drugs or medicines for which an authorized
prescription is required by law.
The appellant respectfully contends that the foregoing sub-section
(5) of 58-12-30 £.£.A. "clearly covers" the factual data of the instant case
for the following specific reasens:
1.

Only 58-12-30 U.C.A. "clearly covers" the act of: "practicing
medicine without a license", as required by Ogden City v.
McLaughlin, Supra.

2.

The very wording of the exceptions that the Utah Legislature
has made at sub-section (5) and (6) of 58-12-30 tJ.C^.A. is
clear and convincing evidence of the indisputable fact the
Utah Legislature did not:
(a) INTEND...that "practicing medicine without a license
to be prosecuted as a criminal offense, per se, But
(b) The Utah Legislature - under 58-12-30 U.C.A.
1. expressly accorded specific circumstances under which
"persons may engage in activities included in the
practice of medicine...subject to the circumstances
and limitations stated" (e.g. sub-section (5) cited at
length on the proceeding page).

Thus, it would appear, abundantly clear, that by the Trial Court at pages 3
and 4 of the Trail Transcript "Granting" the Prosecution's "motion" to
"Amend" the "Information" (to convert the mere difinition of the term...
"practice of medicine" at 58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C.A. into a "crime" and being
"restricted" to 58-12-28 (_4) (A) U..C.A. constituted an act on the part of the
Court by which it divested itself of subject-matter Jurisdiction of the

alleged offense of "practicing medicine without a lecense" since "restricting"
the prosecution to jtt-12-28^ (4.) (A) U.C.A. the Court "restricted" (T. 3-4) the
prosecution to State Statutory provisions.
1. Which does not "clearly cover" a criminal offense. Nor,
2.

Invoke the jurisdiction of the Trial Court as to the subjectmatter of the offense alleged to be "criminal" and is
"clearly covered" (Ogden City v. McLaughlin, Supra), under the
applicable but not used controlling provisions of 58-12-30 £.C^A..
and 58-12-30(5) £.C.A. in the instant case.

And in such specific regard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has said:
"Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived nor conferred by
consent of the parties", United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d
832 (10th Cir. 1981).
And the Supreme Court has said that when, as occurred in the instant case, a
Judegment is rendered by a Court without its jurisdiction having been invoked
accordingly its judgement "must be declared a nullity".

See: State v. Teleford,

72 P.2d 626. The absence of jurisdiction should be declared fatal to the
validity of the conviction in the instant case.
POINT III
The Appellant was convicted without any evidence of his guilt and
the State (Art. I Sec. 7, Const, of Utah) and Federal (5th and 14th Amendments)
guarantee of "Due Process" was violated thereby.
To substantiate the foregoing contention the appellant respectfully submits that his conviction of "operating a pyramid scheme" and "practicing
medicine without a license" were effected without at least some showing of
evidence as was attempted in Petree where "recurring dreams" compelled him
to call his sister in Las Vegas, Nevada and the haunting effects of the
murdered girl led to Petree1s prosecution or murder (State v. Petree, 639

P.2d 453 (1983) and "some evidence" in the instant case, when the lawless
tape recorded oral communications os the appellant's "set-up" visit at the
request of Rosamunde Krolls (T. 45) was working fully with "Investigator"
Frank Wall (T. 53

151, 158) is not "used at all" consistent with

Silverthorne Lumbar Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).

There

remains no evidnetairy support for the appellant's conviction whatsoever.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when, as in the instant
case, a conviction has been effected without evidence of guilt, Due Process
of Law as guaranteed under the 5th and 14 Amendments to to Federal Constitution.
SEE: Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1962)
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968)
Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232 (1972)
Vochon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
At 76-1-501 U..C..A. the Legislature of the State of Utah requires
proof as to "each element" of the crime charges as follows:
76-1-501 U/C^A. Presumption of innocence "element of the offense"
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof the defendant shall
be acquitted.
The Supreme Court also requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
as to "each element of the offense charged" (accord: _IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).
However, when such constitutionally required "burden of proof"
is applied to the factual data of the instant case, and the following

inescapable conclusions are apparent:
1. That the appellant1 s conduct ijs not shown by the Record
in the instant case to have exceeded the scope of the
exception accorded by the Utah Legislature which expressly
approves the "home remedy" that is encompassed within the
appellant's "oxyogen" and/or "hydrogen peroxide" suggested
remedies that are definitely not required to be obtained
by an "authorized prescription required by law" and
therefore under the provisions od sub-section (5)
of 58-12-30 £.C.A. the recorded conduct of the appellant
at the residence of Mrs. Krolls (T. 45) cannot in any way
be declared to be illegal,
2. Nor can it be reasonable concluded that any cchnduct on the
part of the appellant constituted any possible violation of
the ambiguous content of 76-6a-3 £*£«A. under which the appellant
was convicted of "operating a pyramid scheme" (which remains
yet to be shown to have really existed at law, if in fact
there is such a "scheme".
3. The appellant was therefore convicted without any evidence
of his guilt and the State and Federal Constitutional guarantee
of Due Process of Law was violated thereby.
ACCORD: Thompson v. City of Louisville/ Supra
Garner v. Louisiana, Supra,
Adderly v. Florida, Supra,
Johnson v. Florida, Supra,
Harris y. United States, Supra,
Jackson v. Virginia, Supra.
POINT IV
The provisions of 76-6a-3 £.C.A. are viod for vagueness and are
unconstitutionally insufficient based upon which the appellant's conviction
can be allowed to stand.
The appellant relies upon the majority decision of the United
States Supreme Court in its condemnation or the former (repealed) provisions
of 76-12-1(5) U..C.A. as "unconstitutional" wherin the late Justice Douglas
said, inter alia:

"The State Legislature tried to cover so much that
it suceeded in covering nothing effectively."
cf. Musser v. State of Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948)
But at the heart of the Musser are the following words which
specifically condemned sub-section (5) of the aforesaid repealed provisions
of 76-12-1:
"For this statute to be valid it cannot be so vague
that it fails adequately to define the offense or to
give reasonable standards for determining guilt,
otherwise it would have violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, cf.
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
Applied to the instant case the appellant was convicted of violating the
provisions of 76-6a-3 U/C..A- which are worded:
76-6a-3 U..C.A. (1) a person may not organize, establish
promote any pyramid scheme,
(2) a conviction under this chapter is prima facia
evidnece of a violation of Section 13-11-4 The Utah
Consumer Sale Practice Act.
(3) any violation of this chapter constitutes.a violation
of Section 13-11-4 the Utah Consumers Sales Practice
Act.
(4) All civil violations of this chapter shall be
investigated and prosecuted as prescribed by the
Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act.
At 76-6a-2(4) a "pyramid scheme" is defined:
"Pyramid scheme" means any sales device, or plan under
which a person gives consideration to another person
in exchange for compensation or the right to recieve
compensation which is derived primarily from
introduction of other persons into the sales device or plan
rather than from the sale of goods, services or other
property.
From the foregoing intermingle ambiguous substance of 76-6a-3 tJ.C^.A.
and its vague (undefined reference to any specific subject-matter of
13-11-4 of the "Utah Consumers Sales Practice Act") and then and there:

1.

Not spelling out the elements of 13-11-4 U..C.A. nor

2.

The "definition" of J3-11-4. U..C.A.

But such inclusion of such vague and ambiguous reference to 13-11-4
within the scope of 76-6a-3 U.C.A. renders such statutory provisions itself
(i.e. 76-6a-3 U.C.A.
(1)

Without a rational and complete "definition"
as required under Musser v. State of Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948), and

(2)

With a "standard for determining guilt" as
required under Musser v. State of Utah, supra.

And for such specific reasons the provisions of 76-6a-3 U.C.A. are totally
viod for vagueness and their unconstitutional content should be declared
fatal to the validity of the appellant's conviction for "operating a pyramid
scheme".
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently placed
very special emphasis on "Fundamental Fairness" (see; e.g. Walker v. State
of Utah, 624 P.2d 687 /Utah 1981/) and declared the "Prosecution has a duty
to see that justice is done" (Cordianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874 /1979/)
and relative to the inherent "ignoble part" (Omstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 /1928/) and "Ignoble short-cut ot a conviction" (Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 /1962/) that was admittedly taken by Frank Wall (T. 53, 151, 158)
the United States Supreme Court has said that:
"While prosecutors may strike hard blows, they
are not at liberty to strike low blows".
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 98 (1935).
And while the appellant was not entitled to "a perfect trial",
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 601 (1953), he was entitled to "a fair
trial" under Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, and the 5th and

14th Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Because the Trial Courts Jurisdiction was not invoked as to the
erroneous an inapplicable statutory provisions (58-12-28(4)(A) IJ.C.A.) in
light of the controlling and applicable provisions of 58-12-30 £.£*A.
having been circumvented the Trial Courts Judgement without jurisdiction
should be declared "a nullity" (State v. Teleford, 72 P.2d 626).
Because no reasonable ascertainable of evidence of the appellant*s
guilt as to either of the two (2) charges is a matter of record.

It should

follow at law therefrom that the convictions of thh appellant should not be
allowed to stand if "Fair Play" is indeed "at the heart of Due Prosses of
Law".

Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and "Justice must satisfy the

appearance of Justice" Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1955).
The Appellant therefore respectfully submits that his convictions
should be reversed and his case remanded to the District Court for a dismissal
of the charges in the interest of a fair administration of "even handed
justice".

respectfully submitted,

Appellant Pro Se

